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Short-termist	and	self-defeating:	Assessing	the	EU’s
response	to	the	crisis	in	Libya
Political	instability	in	Libya	is	viewed	as	one	of	the	key	contributing	factors	to	Europe’s	migration	crisis,
and	the	EU	has	taken	an	active	role	in	addressing	the	problem.	But	how	effective	have	the	EU’s	efforts
been	in	Libya?	Based	on	new	research,	Luca	Raineri	highlights	some	key	failings	in	the	EU’s
approach,	noting	that	there	has	been	a	significant	disjoint	between	the	ambitious	objectives	highlighted
by	EU	leaders	and	their	capacity	and	willingness	to	achieve	these	goals	in	practice.
EU	High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy,	Federica	Mogherini,	speaking	after	Libya	Quartet	meeting,	Credit:
EEAS	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
The	outcome	of	the	recent	Italian	election	has	confirmed	a	trend	that	is	becoming	prevalent	across	the	whole	of
Europe:	a	rise	of	far-right	parties,	propelled	by	the	(perception	of	a)	migration	crisis	at	Europe’s	borders.	Borders	that,
insofar	as	migration	is	concerned,	largely	correspond	to	the	Mediterranean	Sea	and	Libya,	especially	since	the	EU-
Turkey	deal	has	clamped	down	on	the	flow	of	asylum	seekers	along	the	Balkan	route.
Although	populist	politicians	frequently	claim	that	Brussels	has	done	nothing	to	prevent	the	influx	of	migrants	–	or	has
simply	made	things	worse	–	it	is	undeniable	that	the	European	Union	has	taken	an	active	role	in	addressing	the
Libyan	crisis.	This	crisis	is	complex	and	multi-faceted,	and	involves	aspects	far	more	intricate	than	migration	alone,
including	energy	security,	strategic	competition	with	Russia,	and	the	struggle	against	terrorism,	as	well	as
subterranean	hostilities	among	EU	member	states	themselves.	All	of	this,	while	Libyan	state	institutions	have
collapsed	and	there	is	no	credible	counterpart	to	negotiate	with	in	sight,	unlike	in	the	case	of	Turkey.
What	is	much	less	clear,	though,	is	the	extent	to	which	the	EU	crisis	response	in	Libya	is	consistent	with	the
commitments	that,	according	to	available	strategic	documents,	should	orient	European	action	abroad.	These	include
policy	coherence	and	consistency,	a	comprehensive	approach	to	security,	conflict	sensitivity,	local	ownership,	human
rights	obligations,	and	humanitarian	principles.	Indeed,	the	European	crisis	response	in	Libya	has	exposed	Brussels
to	unprecedented	criticism,	calling	into	question	the	EU’s	ambition	to	be	perceived	as	a	bulwark	of	liberal	values
inspired	by	“principled	pragmatism”	(as	per	the	2016	Global	Strategy),	let	alone	as	a	“force	for	good”	(2003	European
Security	Strategy)	in	its	foreign	policy	and	in	its	neighbourhood.
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Take	for	instance	the	exceptionally	virulent	statement	issued	by	UN	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	Zeid
Ra’ad	Al	Hussein,	on	the	eve	of	last	November’s	summit	between	the	EU	and	the	African	Union:	“the	European
Union’s	policy	of	assisting	the	Libyan	Coast	Guard	to	intercept	and	return	migrants	in	the	Mediterranean	is
inhuman…	The	increasing	interventions	of	the	EU	and	its	member	states	have	done	nothing	so	far	to	reduce	the
level	of	abuses	suffered	by	migrants”.	One	could	hardly	find	a	greater	discrepancy	between	this	statement	and	the
UNHCR’s	assertion	that	“EU	leadership	in	responding	to	refugee	crises	is	crucial”	and	that	the	UNHCR	stands	with
the	EU	in	“upholding	the	key	European	values	of	solidarity	and	cooperation”.
Does	this	mean	that	EU	leaders	pay	mere	lip-service	to	the	principles	mentioned	above,	and	that	amidst	the	blood
and	dust	of	a	real	conflict	what	is	written	on	paper	is	not	actually	relevant	when	it	comes	to	putting	into	practice
concrete	policy	measures?	To	answer	this	question,	it	is	necessary	to	combine	a	top-down	understanding	of	policy
design	with	a	bottom-up	investigation	of	the	implications	and	practicalities	of	crisis	response	on	the	ground.	This	is
what	I	and	my	co-authors	have	attempted	to	do	in	a	recent	working	paper	which	focuses	on	how	the	EU
substantiates	its	crisis	response	in	Libya,	focusing	on	the	security	practices	of	practitioners	connecting	decision-
makers	in	Brussels	to	final	beneficiaries	in	Libya.
Our	findings,	which	were	based	on	a	large	set	of	interviews	with	key	stakeholders	in	Tunis	and	Rome,	are	disturbing.
A	few	examples	are	particularly	illustrative	of	how	the	EU	crisis	response	in	Libya	is	falling	short	of	fulfilling	its
normative	commitments.	Take	the	(much	publicised)	training	of	the	Libyan	Coast	Guard,	which	was	officially	meant
to	contribute	to	saving	migrants	at	sea	and	to	help	disrupt	human	smuggling.	Our	research	uncovered	that	some
individuals	accused	of	being	responsible	for	smuggling	oil	and	trafficking	human	beings	appear	amongst	the
beneficiaries	of	EU	training,	thereby	suggesting	that	the	vetting	procedure	of	the	trainees	has	fallen	short	of
appropriate	standards	of	due	diligence.	As	local	sources	put	it:	“criminal	groups	have	already	infiltrated	everything	as
a	result	of	thugs	being	turned	into	cops”.
No	matter	how	distasteful,	this	outcome	is	largely	in	line	with	the	predictions	of	the	literature	on	protection
economies,	which	warns	that	the	most	likely	result	of	purely	security-oriented	responses	is	the	sucking	of	state	actors
into	the	gears	of	the	business	of	irregular	migration.	Coupled	with	the	disruption	of	Libya’s	institutional	framework,	the
unwarranted	legitimisation	and	co-option	of	highly	controversial	security	actors	can	only	lead	to	widespread	impunity
and	a	lack	of	access	to	legal	remedies	for	the	victims	of	abuses.
More	generally,	EU-sponsored	humanitarian	and	development	programmes	in	Libya	are	often	subject	to	high
politicisation	and	pressure	from	Brussels,	carrying	the	risk	of	turning	needs-driven	projects	into	politically	or	funds-
driven	projects.	The	limited	room	for	local	stakeholders	to	provide	input	into	the	process	reduces	local	ownership	as
well	as	context	and	conflict-sensitivity,	while	remote	management	amplifies	the	room	for	suboptimal	project	design
and	monitoring.	These	shortcomings	also	affect	some	of	the	projects	funded	by	the	EU	Trust	Fund	(EUTF),	a	newly
established	(and	again,	much	publicised)	tool	that	should	theoretically	contribute	to	tackling	the	root	causes	of
migration.
Our	research	suggests	that	there	is	a	significant	disjoint	between	the	ambitious	objectives	and	declarations	of	the
EU’s	response	in	Libya,	and	the	EU’s	capacity	or	willingness	to	achieve	its	stated	goals.	Distorted	expectations
among	beneficiaries,	local	counterparts,	and	European	audiences	are	the	result	of	prioritising	short-term	objectives.
EU	leaders	have	sought	quick-fix	solutions	in	responding	to	the	anxieties	of	their	constituents,	who	allegedly	perceive
growing	migrant	flows	from	Libya	as	an	existential	threat.	As	migration	has	become	securitised	and	framed	as	an
emergency,	EU	leaders	have	appeared	to	address	the	needs	of	European	audiences	more	than	those	of	Libyan
stakeholders	and	vulnerable	groups.
However,	this	decoupling	of	rhetoric	and	practice	could	lead	to	EU	external	action	and	crisis	responses	being	seen
as	little	more	than	abstract	wish-lists	rather	than	serious	policy	strategies.	And	this,	in	turn,	risks	lending	weight	to
those	who	cast	doubt	on	the	usefulness	of	the	European	Union,	both	for	the	wider	world	as	well	as	for	Europe	itself.
Overlooking	EU	core	liberal	values	can	only	make	anti-European	sentiments	more,	not	less,	relevant.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
_________________________________
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